It was estimated that 350,000 people had been in Hiroshima city on 6 August 1945, when the bomb was dropped. Near the hypocenter, 80-100% of people died on the same day and in the areas 1.2 km away from the hypocenter, approximately 50%. By the end of the year, when the occurrence of acute radiation syndrome largely completed, an estimated number of 140,000 died. (Source: Hiroshima City)

A relatively small number of people died instantly from the explosion. Most of the early deaths were as a result of subsequent fires or initial burns and injuries with little or no primary treatment. This is why survivors remember the situation as great human suffering and misery.

The number of the casualties of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima (140,000) and Nagasaki (70,000) represented 51% of the total casualty number (413,000) by the US air raid on Japan.

After the war, under the occupation, the public health area was overseen by the Public Health and Welfare Section (PHW) of the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), headed by Colonel (later Brigadier-General) Crawford F. Sams. One of the measures he implemented was the suppression of any reports on the medical effects of the atomic bombings prepared by Japanese experts. He wanted to prevent any atomic bombing-related information from becoming public particularly to the Soviet Union. Such reports were intended to help the medical professions treat survivors with unprecedented burn injuries and previously unknown radiation sickness, who were dispersed throughout Western Japan.

Sams resigned over Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur in 1951, which waned the authority of the PHW. Eventually, in the same year, six years after the bombings, the Japan Society for Promotion of Science, an agency under the Ministry of Education, finally published a two-volume report entitled Reports on Medical Effects of the Atomic Bombs. By then, tens of thousands of survivors had died due to radiation effects. The welfare of the survivors was totally neglected by Sams’ policy that gave priority to the US national interest.

Source: “Promoting Health in American-Occupied Japan: Resistance to Allied Public Health Measures, 1945-1952”, American Journal of Public Health, Nishimura, Sey, PhD, Vol. 99, Issue 8, August 2009, 1364-75. Also available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2707457/

During the occupation period from 1945 to 1952, the GHQ strictly enforced measures to prevent dissemination of information regarding Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This policy hindered not only the people outside of Japan to know what happened with the civilians on the ground in Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also the Japanese Government from taking measures for the welfare of the atomic bomb survivors. It was not until 1962 that a medical allowance was offered to survivors whose incomes fell below a certain level. The survivors were effectively “forgotten” from the society under the occupation. A number of survivors died in poverty with little treatment for their radiation-related illnesses.

In connection with the hiding of an inconvenient truth about the human impact of the atomic bombs, an article of the Irish Times noted: “In a radio broadcast within hours of Hiroshima, Truman told the nation: “We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have standing above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories and their communications [no human impacts were mentioned]. Let there be no doubt” … Days later, of course, Truman made good on his threat. One of the first doctors to arrive in Hiroshima after the blast told: “Tremendous numbers of unidentified corpses were piled up and cremated on the spot. The injured and irradiated continued to die. Day and night in every corner of the city, corpses are piled upon the corpses and burned…It wasn’t until the Australian Wilfred Burchett arrived as the first journalist to make it to Hiroshima that the aftermath of the explosion was described to a western audience: “I write this as warning to the world,” was his intro on page one of the Daily Express. He described in detail how he had walked through a hospital ward packed with people with their skin hanging in flaps from their bodies, eyes opaque, dying, but with no visible marks. There being no word for it yet, he wrote of “an atomic plague.” In retaliation for telling it as he had seen it, his press accreditation was famously withdrawn. He was vilified for years. In some circles he still is…The allies maintained that radiation sickness was a myth, insisting that all the dead had perished in the initial blasts.”

It was John Hersey’s “Hiroshima” that informed the wider public around the world what happened to the people in Hiroshima. It was published originally in The New Yorker in August 1946, one year after the war ended. It became an immediate sensation and reprinted in many languages around the world. The publication of the Japanese version was permitted in 1949. It is now available online at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1946/08/31/hiroshima

Source: “Eamonn McCann: Hiroshima was a crime against humanity,” Irish Times, 6 August 2015. Available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/eamonn-mccann-hiroshima-was-a-crime-against-humanity-1.2307837

In May 1943, when the US Military Policy Committee discussed the use of the first atomic bomb, “the general view appeared to be that its best point of use would be on a Japanese fleet concentration in the Harbor of Truk [in the Pacific, north of New Guinea]. [Lieutenant] General Styer suggested Tokyo but it was pointed out that the bomb should be used where, if it failed to go off, it would land in water of sufficient depth to prevent easy salvage. The Japanese were selected as they would not be so apt to secure knowledge from it as would the Germans.”

However, by 1945, the targets were shifted to cities. The following excerpt of an unclassified US document, entitled “Summary of the second meeting of the Target Committee and dated 12 May 1945, reveals the [ultimate] three qualifications applied in selecting the targets of atomic bombing (underlined): (A copy of this document is exhibited in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.)

“…6. Status of Targets
A. Dr. Stearns described the work he had done on target selection. He has surveyed possible targets possessing the following qualifications: (1) they be important targets in a large urban area of more than three miles diameter, (2) they be capable of being damaged effectively by a blast, and (3) they are likely to be unattacked by next August. Dr. Stearns had a list of five targets which the Air Forces would be willing to reserve for our use unless unforeseen circumstances arise…”

These criteria suggest that the US military’s biggest concern was to know the impact and effect that can be produced by atomic bombs on cities, which not to mention include people, buildings and other infrastructure. To have the maximum impact and effect, atomic bombs were dropped in the center of cities, which resulted in indiscriminately civilian killings.

In Hiroshima, the industrial areas as well as the port of Hiroshima were located in the south of the city, over 4 km away from the hypocenter of the atomic bombing. There was therefore no direct impact from the blast of the atomic bomb on “those militarily important targets.” The hypocenter was located in the busiest commercial center of the city, which clearly made the bombing a crime against humanity.

Nagasaki had a population of 240,000 at the time of the atomic bombing. Almost 74,000 people died by the year-end, 65 percent of whom were women, children and the aged. Those exposed to the atomic bombing but survived counted 140,000. Thus, the atomic bombing dropped in the heart of the city killed or affected nearly 90 percent of the city’s population.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly had industries and military facilities, just like other major cities in Japan at that time. However, it is highly questionable whether that aspect was important at all in selecting target cities. The US military were able to destroy any cities by conventional bombs without any difficulty. Over 100 cities and towns had been bombed by then; the US Air Force was requested not to bomb those target cities by the Target Committee.

Harry Truman said in his speech after dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, “…We are now prepared to destroy more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise that the Japanese have in any city. We shall destroy their docks and factories and their communications… We shall completely destroy Japan’s power to make war…” This message was one of the reasons why such a distorted justification was established that “because it was a military base, Hiroshima was attacked with an atomic bomb.”

In the next year of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the US founded the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) in Hiroshima to study the medical effects of nuclear bombs on humans. Hiroshima survivors were specimens of the study (without being offered with any treatment). In the same year, the US military conducted an atomic bomb test over Bikini Atoll in the Pacific, where an atomic bomb was dropped over 79 vessels including captured Japanese navy vessels to see the impact on them. The US military had conducted 22 additional tests there by 1958.

Sources: Leslie R. Groves, Memorandum, “Military Policy Committee,” Records of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942–1948, Record Group 77, National Archives, Washington, D.C. “MPC Minutes, 5 May 43 mtg”
“President Harry S. Truman reads prepared speech after dropping of atomic bomb on …HD Stock Footage”, Youtube video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3Ib4wTq0jY
“How Bikini Atoll nuclear tests were conducted”, Zenjiro Doi, Kojinsha, 2010 (Japanese).

According to an unclassified document entitled “Tube Alloys (the code name of the British atomic bomb project),” on 18 September 1944, prior to the successful development of atomic bombs, Winston Churchill and Franklin D Roosevelt agreed with the use of atomic bombs against the Japanese, although targets of the atomic bombs were not decided. The following is an excerpt of the document (a copy is exhibited in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum).

“Aide-memoire of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, September 18, 1944.

1. The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding Tube Alloys, with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a “bomb” is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender…”

It is safe to say that this aide-memoire, which was written about one year before the actual use of the bombs, was intended by the US to garner support from the UK for the use of the atomic bombs against the Japanese (rather than against the Germans).

The fact that Japan surrendered after the US atomic bombings does not necessarily mean that the use of atomic bombs was necessary to end the war. In fact, by then, the Japanese Government officially requested the Soviet Union for mediation with the US, which the US was aware of. From a military standpoint, most military leaders were in opposition of the use of the atomic bombs, whether or not at the time they expressed their view directly to the political leader. Further, some evidence emerged suggests that Truman had other agenda in deciding the use—in relation to the Soviet Union and the development cost of atomic bombs. The US official view today does not limit the motive only to the purpose of ending the war with fewer war casualties. It also refers to the intimidating effect to the Soviet Union. An unclassified document further suggests the US administration had to materially show the benefit of atomic bombs to the US public to justify the enormous unannounced cost of developing the atomic bombs—$ 8 billion.

Some examples of opposition views within the US leadership:

“..[Herbert] Hoover points out that on September 20, 1945, Major General Curtis LeMay, commander of the U.S. air force in its bombing of Japan, said “the atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war… The war could have been over in two weeks without the Russians coming in and without the atomic bomb.” The following month, Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, concurred: “The atomic bomb did not win the war against Japan. The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace….” Hoover recounts, further, that Admiral William D. Leahy later wrote that “it is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon… was of no material assistance… The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.” Hoover’s editor, George Nash, adds a footnote saying that “in an interview (on November 11, 1963) [General Dwight D.] Eisenhower declared that he had opposed dropping the bomb for two reasons: ‘First, the Japanese were ready to surrender and… Second, I hated to see our country to be the first to use such a weapon.'”

A longer list of opposition views is available at: http://www.colorado.edu/AmStudies/lewis/2010/atomicdec.htm

Sources: “Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath,” Herbert Hoover, edited by George H. Nash, Hoover Institution Press, 2011.

“Herbert Hoover’s “Secret History of World War II” – and Some Reflections it Prompts,” Dwight D. Murphey, Wichita State University, retired. Available at: http://dwightmurphey-collectedwritings.info/JSPES-DDM-BkRevArt-HooverWWII.htm

Japan’s error of judgement of the attack on Pearl Harbor was a direct reaction to the oil embargo (and assets freeze) by the US, UK and the Netherlands. Without indigenous oil resources, oil import was a lifeline for Japan. Because of the US sea blockade and a large loss of merchant ships, “fuels for airplanes were projected to be exhausted around September and this had been reported to the Imperial Council meeting attended by the Emperor (by the summer 1945).”

Source: “Showa-shi Kougi (Showa History Lecture),” Chapter 14, “Sacred decision and political process of war-end,” Tabun Suzuki, Chikuma Publishing, 2015, pp247-264.

Recent historical research provides the following sequence of events prior to the surrender:

• The Suzuki Cabinet formally requested the Soviet Union to mediate peace with the US on 13 July 1945. Since the Soviet Union had accepted a request from the US to enter a war with Japan by then, they did not make a proper reply. They further postponed a reply on the grounds of the scheduled Potsdam meeting.
• The Potsdam Declaration was issued on 26 July 1945.
• The Japanese Government’s reaction to the Potsdam Declaration was mainly confusion. This was because in the declaration, the Soviet Union was not included and no reference was made to the Emperor. (The Japanese Government’s main concern was whether the national structure with the Emperor as the head of state could be maintained or not.) Therefore, the Japanese Government decided to wait for a reaction from the Soviet Union. (The Japanese Government knew that the US was aware of the fact that they made a request to the Soviet Union for mediation.)
• On 9 August, the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan with a large-scale attack on the Japanese military in Manchuria and the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. For the Japanese army, the former was regarded as the most critical factor that could decide the fate of the nation. The Japanese army had wished that that would not happen before the mainland battles.
• In the afternoon on the same day, two emergency meetings were held attended by the Emperor, but no conclusion was reached until after midnight when a decision was made to accept the Potsdam Declaration with a condition of no change to “the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.” The decision was conveyed to the Allied Forces. It was 28 hours after the commencement of the Soviet advancement.
• After several events including the US dropping of surrender recommendation handbills from planes over Tokyo that included a reply to the Japanese conditional acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, a meeting was requested by the Emperor on 14 August, where it was decided at an initiative of the Emperor to drop the condition in order to avoid any coup attempts by those who insisted “the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.”

The author of the research believes that at the national level, the following four factors brought forward a decision to surrender, although at the individual level, the reason may vary.

• A desire to avoid ultimate battles on the main land (because of the lack of capability to continue the war)
• Atomic bombings
• Soviet Union’s advancement
• Acceptable conditions of non-conditional surrender (the tone of the Potsdam Declaration)

Source: “Showa-shi Kougi (Showa History Lecture),” Chapter 14, “Sacred decision and political process of war-end,” Tabun Suzuki, Chikuma Publishing, 2015, pp247-264.

The US Strategic Bombing Survey published in 1946 states: “…It seems clear that, even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion. …Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that … Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Source: United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Washington DC, 1 July 1946.
The summary report is available at http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm

Some historians in Japan question whether Truman, with already developed atomic bombs in hand, indeed intended to offer an opportunity to surrender in the Potsdam Declaration. The following excerpt of a George Nash’s edited book supports such a question:

“[Herbert] Hoover says that “early in February, 1945, Mr. Roosevelt received a long dispatch from General MacArthur, outlining terms of peace that could be made with Japan. These terms amounted to unconditional surrender, except for maintaining the position of the emperor and strongly urging that no concessions be made to Russia.” The next month, a Japanese overture was made through Sweden; and in April “the Emperor substituted a group of civilian anti-militarists for the militarist ministry”. Another attempt was made by Japan through Moscow in July, and a mission by Prince Konoye (who was then back in favor) for this purpose was refused by Stalin. Hoover says that President Truman knew of this overture. Indeed, Hoover himself had in mid-May sent Truman a memo supporting the overture. In the face of all this, the declaration made at the Potsdam conference in July continued to insist on unconditional surrender, and Japan was informed only after its surrender following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that it could retain its emperor (which was an item of inestimable importance to the Japanese).”

Many historians point out a few reasons why Truman decided to use atomic bombs despite the fact that the surrender was imminent. One is to demonstrate the destructive power of atomic bombs particularly to the Soviet Union, and another is to justify the spending of eight billion dollars to develop the atomic bomb, which the public was not informed of until his first announcement of the bombing of Hiroshima.

Sources: “Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath,” Herbert Hoover, edited by George H. Nash, Hoover Institution Press, 2011.

Some people believe that advanced warnings were given to Japan about the atomic bombings; on the contrary, the fact is that it was decided not to give any warnings. See below as a reference:
“On June 6 (1945), (the Secretary of War Henry) Stimson informed President Truman that the Interim Committee recommended keeping the atomic bomb a secret until Japan had been bombed. The attack should take place as soon as possible and without warning. “
https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945/debate.htm (US Department of Energy)

[The United States] used two atomic weapons on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to bring a rapid and conclusive end to the war with Japan. U.S. officials did not debate at length whether to use the atomic bomb against Japan, but argued that it was a means to a faster end to the Pacific conflict that would ensure fewer conventional war casualties. They did, however, consider the role that the bomb’s impressive power could play in postwar U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.

Source: “Atomic Diplomacy,” Office of the Historian, US Government.
Available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/atomic

The Government of Japan does not give its views on the atomic bombings, while it provides its views on some other issues of WWII in the form of Q&A on its website: Historical Issues Q&A, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html)

Residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki jointly brought to the Tokyo District Court an action against the Japanese Government for the damages they and their family members suffered as a result of the atomic bombings by the US in August 1945. The case included a claim that the dropping of the atomic bombs was an unlawful act and that the Japanese Government, as they waived the claims for damages against the US, has an obligation to compensate the damages. The action was denied on 7 December 1963. However, importantly, the court found that the US had violated international law (as well as US domestic law) by the atomic bombings.

The decision and a summary can be viewed on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/aa559087dbcf1af5c1256a1c0029f14d?OpenDocument

The original court ruling in Japanese can be found at: http://www.geocities.jp/bluemilesjp/genbaku.html
The following is a part of it (the assessment by international law):

二、国際法による評価

　原子爆弾の投下は、当時日本国と交戦国の関係にあつた米国によってなされた戦闘行為であるが、それは当時の実定国際法（条約及び慣習法）に反する違法な戦闘行為である。

（一）（１）　まず、セント・ペテルスブルグ宣言（一八六八年一二月一一日）は、文明国の進歩に伴ってできるだけ戦争の危機は制限されなければならず、戦争における唯一の正当な目的は敵の兵力を弱めることであり、その目的を達するためにはなるべく数多くの人を戦闘の外に置き、そして戦闘外に置かれた人の苦痛を無益に増大したり落命を必然とする兵器の使用はこの目的の範囲を超えるものであつて、このような兵器の使用は人道に反するものとして、締盟国相互が戦争をする場合には、軍隊又は艦隊をして四〇〇グラム以下で爆発性の、又は燃焼性の物をもつて充てた発射物の使用の自由を放棄することを約している。

（２）　次いで、一八九九年に制定されたヘーグ陸戦条規は、陸戦法一般に関する法典であるが、その第二二条において、特に禁止するものとして、毒又は毒を施した兵器の使用、不必要な苦痛を与える兵器、投射物その他の物質の使用を挙げ、第二五条において防守せざる都市の攻撃又は砲撃を禁じ、第二六条において砲撃の際は事前通告を必要とするものとし、また第二七条においては攻撃の目標は軍事目標に限るべきことを規定している。

（３）　第二回ヘーグ平和会議において採択された特殊弾丸（通称ダムダム弾）の使用禁止宣言（一九〇七年）、ジュネーブで採択された毒ガス等の禁止に関する議定書（一九二五年）の解釈からも、同様の結論が生ずる。

（４）　そして、一九二三年の空戦法規案第二二条は、普通人民を威嚇し、軍事的性質を有しない私有財産を破壊し、非戦闘員を損傷することを目的とする空中爆撃を禁止している。さらに、第二四条では、空中爆撃は軍事目標に対して行われた場合に限り適法とされ（一、二項）、軍隊の作戦行動の直近地域にない都市、町村、住宅建物に対する爆撃を禁じ、普通人民に対し無差別爆撃の結果となる場合は爆撃を避止すべきものとし（三項）、軍隊の作戦行動の直近地域についても、兵力がきわめて集中し、かつ、普通人民に与える危険と比較してみてもなお爆撃を正当とする場合に限り適法とし（四項）、以上に違反した交戦国は、身体又は財産上の損害について賠償金を支払わねばならないことを規定している（五項）。空戦法規案は実定法とはいえないが、その内容は条理国際法として、あるいは慣習国際法としてその効力を認めることができよう。なお、一九四八年に国際連合総会で採択された集団殺害の防止及び処罰に関する条約は、本件原子爆弾投下の後のものであるけれども、その内容は条理国際法として、それ以前から人類の間に存在するものであつて、それが後になって明文化されたにすぎない。

（５）　これらの戦闘行為に関する国際法は、当時の実定国際法として、原子爆弾についても当然適用されるものである。原子爆弾は新兵器であるからこれらを直ちに適用又は準用することが文理上困難であるとしても、関係条項を含む条文全体の立法精神に従って、当該条項の適用又は準用をすべきものであつて、前記各条約が原子爆弾の出現によって事情変更を理由として、その適用を排除され、或は無効になったものとみるべきではない。仮にこれらの実定国際法がそのまま適用又は準用されないとしても、その精神は自然法ないし条理国際法としての効力を有するものといわなければならない。

（二）（１）　原子爆弾が絶大な破壊力を有し、広島市及び長崎市に対する原子爆弾の投下によって、現実に爆心地より半径四キロメートルの範囲では、戦闘員であると、非戦闘員であるとを問わず、無差別に殺傷するという結果をもたらしたことは、既に述べたとおりである。原子爆弾のかような効果については、米国において大統領トルーマンをはじめ、その研究及び製造に関係した人々の間では、周知の事実であつた。そして、当時広島市及び長崎市は、日本国の戦力の中心地でもなければ、重要な軍事基地でもなく、また占領に対して抵抗するいわゆる防守地域でもなかつた。従って、広島市及び長崎市に対する原子爆弾の投下行為は、いわゆる無差別爆撃であって、ヘーグ陸戦条規第二五条、第二六条、第二七条の明らかに定めているところに違反し、空戦法規案第二二条、第二四条にも違反すること明らかである。

（２）　また原子爆弾の加害力による人体に与える苦痛の著しいこと及びその残虐なことは、ヘーグ陸戦条規第二三条で禁止されている毒又は毒を施した兵器の使用よりはなはだしいものがあり、ダムダム弾禁止宣言、毒ガス等の禁止に関する議定書の解釈からも当然違法とされるべきである。

（３）　当時日本国は原子爆弾を有しないことはもちろんであり、その敗戦が必至であることは一般のみるところであって、それはもはや時期の問題とされていた。従って、原子爆弾の投下は日本国の戦力破砕の目的に出たものではなくて、日本の官民の闘争心を喪失させるための威嚇手段であって、米国の防衛手段に出たものでもなければ、また報復の目的に出たものでもない。このことは、当時ジエイムズ・フランク教授を委員長とする七人の科学者から成る原子力の社会的政治的意義に関する委員会が、陸軍長官に対し日本に対する原子爆弾投下に反対する勧告を行ったことからも明らかである。それとともに原子爆弾の研究及び製造計画に関与した六四名の科学者からも、同委員会の報告と同趣旨の請願書が大統領宛に提出されたが、これらの報告及び請願は無視され、原子爆弾は無警告で広島市及び長崎市に投下されたのである。

（三）　被告は、原子爆弾の投下が国際法に違反するかどうか直ちに断定し難いと述べ、その理由として原子兵器の使用について実定国際法が存在しなかつたことを主張し、かつ、ヘーグ陸戦条規等の条約の解釈から導き出せないと主張しているが、国際法の解釈に関する一般的原則として論理解釈は許されるのであるから、被告の主張は理由がない。日本国政府は昭和二〇年八月一〇日スイス政府を通じて米国政府に対し、別紙第三表の抗議文を提出している。被告の現在の見解は交戦国という立場をはなれて客観的にみた結果であるというが、それでは当時の日本国政府は正当な国際法の解釈をしなかったことになるのであろうか。原告等は、むしろ短時間のうちに国際法の真髄を捉えて世紀に残る大抗議をしたことを、日本国民として名誉にさえ考えているのである。また、被告は戦争においては敵国を屈伏させるまでは、限定された明示の禁止手段以外ならば、いかなる手段でも用いることができるという見解のようであるが、それは死の商人ならぬ死の政治家の言であって、きわめて遺憾である。